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ExEcutivE summary
•	In	 the	eastern	policies	of	 the	Czech	Republic,	 Slovakia	 and	Hungary,	 re-
lations	with	Ukraine	have	traditionally	remained	in	the	shadow	of	those	
countries’	 higher-priority	 relations	 with	 Russia.	The	 Russian-Ukrainian	
war	did	not	change	this	hierarchy,	although	it	has	led	Bratislava,	Prague	
and	Budapest	to	re-examine	their	eastern	neighbourhood.	Their	diplomat-
ic	contacts	with	Ukraine	have	been	revived,	their	commitment	to	offering	
development	aid	for	Kyiv	has	risen,	and	the	Visegrad	Group	(V4),	mainly	
through	the	V4+	format,	has	begun	to	lobby	more	actively	for	EU	support	
for	Ukraine.	 In	 this	way,	 the	V4	has	contributed	 to	keeping	 the	question	
of	Ukraine	on	the	EU’s	agenda.	The	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	
ratified	the	Association	Agreement	between	the	EU	and	Ukraine	quickly,	
and	 supported	 the	process	of	visa	 liberalisation	 for	Ukraine	and	 the	 im-
plementation	of	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Agreement	(the	
so-called	DCFTA)	between	Ukraine	and	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	Poland’s	
partners	in	the	V4	have	become	involved	in	specific	forms	of	assistance	for	
their	 eastern	 partner,	 including	 energy	 cooperation,	 supporting	 the	 re-
form	process,	and	offering	humanitarian	aid.
•	Support	for	the	European	aspirations	of	Ukraine	and	other	countries	in	the	
EU’s	 eastern	neighbourhood,	next	 to	 the	Western	Balkans,	has	 for	years	
been	one	of	the	flagship	areas	of	the	Visegrad	Group’s	activity.	The	V4	states,	
after	their	accession	to	the	EU	in	2004,	stated	that	one	of	the	main	goals	of	
the	Group’s	further	activity	would	be	their	active	participation	in	shaping	
the	EU’s	neighbourhood	policy	 towards	 the	 states	 of	Eastern	and	South-
Eastern	Europe,	as	well	as	supporting	those	states’	aspirations	to	EU	mem-
bership.	This	policy	gained	more	momentum	after	the	launch	in	2009	of	the	
Eastern	Partnership,	a	Polish-Swedish	initiative	supported	by	the	other	V4	
states.	Its	activity	includes	annual	meetings	between	the	foreign	ministers	
of	the	Visegrad	Group	countries	and	those	of	the	Eastern	Partnership,	often	
with	the	participation	of	other	EU	politicians.
•	Major	 success	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 V4	 states	 and	 Ukraine	 is	
their	rapidly	growing	energy	cooperation.	Slovakia	and	Hungary	(as	well	
as	Poland)	have	enabled	gas	supplies	from	the	West	to	the	Ukraine	via	the	
reverse	flows,	thus	playing	a	key	role	in	ensuring	the	security	of	gas	sup-
plies	to	Ukraine.	This	was	of	great	importance	when	Russia	halted	gas	sup-
plies	 immediately	after	 its	annexation	of	Crimea	 (April-November	2014).	
Thanks	 to	 the	 reverse	 flows	 from	 its	Western	 neighbours,	 Kyiv	 has	 also	
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been	 able	 to	 stop	 all	 its	 purchases	 of	 Russian	 gas	 (November	 2015).	The	
V4	supports	the	transit	of	gas	via	Ukraine;	for	example,	the	leaders	of	the	
Visegrad	Group	states	have	 joined	the	criticism	of	plans	to	construct	 the	
Nord	Stream	2	pipeline,	which	would	bypass	Ukraine,	although	due	to	the	
ongoing	preparations	for	the	implementation	of	this	project,	the	resistance	
from	Poland’s	V4	partners	to	it	is	gradually	decreasing.	Also,	the	Visegrad	
Group	is	involved	in	transferring	experience	to	Ukraine	in	ways	of	increas-
ing	energy	efficiency	and	how	to	implement	reforms	to	the	energy	market,	
thus	supporting	the	country’s	integration	with	the	EU	energy	market.	
•	The	Visegrad	group	is	the	main	format	for	strengthening	the	relationship	
between	Ukraine	 and	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 Europe.	 In	 recent	 years,	
Ukraine	 has	 repeatedly	 held	meetings	 in	 the	 V4+	 formula	 at	 the	 presi-
dential,	prime	ministerial	and	ministerial	levels.	On	each	occasion	these	
meetings	 have	 offered	 opportunities	 not	 only	 to	 express	 the	 Visegrad	
States’	support	for	Ukraine’s	integration	with	the	EU,	but	also	to	discuss	
cooperation	in	specific	sectoral	areas.	One	effect	of	this,	for	example,	was	
the	 inclusion	of	Ukrainian	soldiers	 (who	were	responsible	 for	air	 trans-
port)	in	the	composition	of	the	V4	Battlegroup	which	operated	in	the	EU	in	
the	first	half	of	2016.
•	Ukraine	has	been	the	biggest	non-Visegrad	beneficiary	of	the	programmes	
of	the	International	Visegrad	Fund	(IVF),	which	is	funded	by	contributions	
from	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Poland,	 Slovakia	 and	Hungary.	 Between	 2005	
and	2016	Ukrainians	received	a	total	of	€4.5	million	in	the	form	of	grants	
and	scholarships,	which	represents	6%	of	the	IVF’s	total	budget	in	this	pe-
riod.	Ukraine	has	also	been	the	IVF’s	biggest	beneficiary	of	all	the	Eastern	
Partnership	countries	(nearly	half	of	the	funding	assigned	to	those	states	
goes	to	Ukrainians).	The	projects	financed	by	the	Fund	are	aimed	not	only	
at	 reinforcing	 people-to-people	 contacts	 between	 Ukraine	 and	 the	 Vise-
grad	states,	but	also	support	the	reform	process	in	Ukraine.	One	example	
of	these	activities	is	the	V4	Civil	Servants’	Mobility	Programme,	which	al-
lows	Ukrainian	civil	 servants	 to	gain	experience	 through	study	visits	 to	
the	Czech	Republic,	Poland,	Slovakia	and	Hungary.	
•	Cooperation	within	the	Visegrad	Group	states	has	helped	alleviate	differ-
ences	between	them	in	their	reactions	to	the	Ukrainian-Russian	conflict.	
Slovakia	and	Hungary,	and	to	some	extent	the	Czech	Republic,	have	been	
more	cautious	 in	 their	 criticism	of	Russia,	 although	 in	 the	 joint	declara-
tions	of	the	V4	these	countries	have	been	ready	to	accept	stronger	wording	
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in	 reaction	 to	 the	Kremlin’s	policy	 in	Ukraine.	An	 important	 role	 is	 also	
played	by	the	V4+Ukraine	and	V4+Eastern	Partnership	formats,	thanks	to	
which	the	governments	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	have	
opportunities	 to	hold	 regular	meetings	with	 the	Ukrainian	government.	
The	talks	held	in	the	“V4+”	formats	in	2014	contributed	to	overcoming	the	
initial	scepticism	of	Bratislava	and	Budapest	towards	the	new,	pro-Western	
government	in	Ukraine.	In	the	case	of	Slovakia,	this	scepticism	stemmed	
from	Prime	Minister	Robert	Fico’s	negative	experience	of	the	‘orange’	gov-
ernment	in	Kyiv	during	the	gas	crisis	of	2009.	In	Hungary,	this	was	linked	
to	memories	of	the	activities	of	the	Yushchenko/Tymoshenko	team,	which	
had	been	unfavourable	to	the	Hungarian	minority	in	Ukraine.	
•	The	challenge	for	the	effectiveness	and	credibility	of	the	V4’s	actions	con-
cerning	Ukraine	lies	in	the	differences	between	the	individual	policies	of	
the	V4	member	states	towards	Russia.	Among	Poland’s	partners	in	the	V4,	
there	is	a	strong	belief	that	the	West	should	become	more	involved	in	talks	
with	Russia,	because	without	cooperation	with	Moscow,	it	will	be	unable	
to	stabilise	the	situation	in	the	Middle	East	or	get	a	handle	on	the	migra-
tion	crisis.	Because	of	their	wish	to	maintain	as	good	economic	relations	as	
possible	with	Russia,	the	governments	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	
Hungary	have	avoided	making	too	direct	criticism	of	 the	Kremlin	for	 its	
aggression	towards	Ukraine.	However,	since	the	beginning	of	the	war,	they	
have	declared	themselves	in	favour	of	the	inviolability	of	borders,	the	ter-
ritorial	integrity	and	the	sovereignty	of	Ukraine.	Although	some	V4	leaders	
(the	prime	ministers	of	Slovakia	and	Hungary,	the	Czech	president)	have	
been	 openly	 undermining	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 EU	 sanctions	 against	
Russia,	none	of	the	states	in	the	region	have	chosen	to	block	their	renewal	
in	the	forum	of	the	EU	Council.	In	accordance	with	the	position	agreed	by	
the	EU,	 the	V4	states	have	also	declared	their	 full	support	 for	 the	Minsk	
process	and	the	implementation	of	the	agreements	concluded	in	Minsk. 
•	One	of	the	causes	of	dissension	within	the	Visegrad	Group	in	its	policy	to-
wards	Ukraine	and	Russia	is	the	domestic	disputes	in	the	Czech	Republic	
and	Slovakia	on	their	eastern	policy.	The	behaviour	and	statements	of	the	
Czech	President	Miloš	Zeman	are	unequivocally	pro-Russian,	which	con-
trasts	with	the	approach	of	the	foreign	minister	Lubomír	Zaorálek,	who	is	
critical	 of	 the	Kremlin’s	 actions	 in	Ukraine.	 In	Slovakia,	Prime	Minister	
Fico	has	on	the	one	hand	declared	his	full	support	for	the	government	in	
Kyiv,	while	claiming	on	the	other	hand	that	an	‘American-Russian	geopo-
litical	conflict’	is	taking	place	in	Ukraine,	over	which	the	EU	does	not	have	
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much	influence,	but	is	still	losing	out.	Meanwhile	the	president	of	Slovakia,	
Andrej	Kiska,	has	criticised	Russia	for	its	aggression	and	called	on	the	Slo-
vak	government	to	actively	assist	Kyiv. 
•	The	governments	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	see	Russia	
as	a	reliable	supplier	of	energy	resources,	and	as	a	market	which	is	much	
more	attractive	than	that	of	Ukraine.	The	governments	of	these	three	coun-
tries	have	been	looking	for	ways	to	halt	the	decline	in	mutual	investment	
and	 economic	 turnover	 with	 Moscow	 caused	 by	 the	 sanctions	 and	 the	
economic	crisis	in	Russia.	For	this	purpose,	meetings	of	intergovernmen-
tal	committees	for	economic	cooperation	have	been	organised	at	ministe-
rial	level,	and	the	prime	ministers	of	Slovakia	and	Hungary	and	the	Czech	
president	have	regularly	been	meeting	the	president	of	Russia	to	discuss	
the	prospects	for	further	cooperation.	
•	In	recent	years,	governments	(both	right-	and	left-wing)	in	the	Czech	Re-
public,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	have	attached	great	importance	to	the	policy	
of	increasing	their	exports	to	Russia.	In	the	East	they	see	an	opportunity	
to	 gain	 new	markets,	 in	 connection	with	 the	 economic	 problems	 of	 the	
euro-area	states.	Exports	 from	the	Central	European	countries	 to	Russia	
are	of	little	importance	for	their	own	economies,	but	their	collapse	has	hit	
individual	 companies	hard.	Trade	between	 the	Czech	Republic,	 Slovakia	
&	Hungary	and	Ukraine	is	much	lower	compared	to	their	economic	coop-
eration	with	Russia.	For	this	reason,	politicians’	activity	to	encourage	the	
development	of	economic	cooperation	between	Ukraine	and	the	countries	
of	Central	Europe	has	so	far	been	rather	moderate,	both	in	Kyiv	and	in	the	
countries	 of	 the	 region.	 However,	 hope	 of	 improving	 this	 situation	 has	
come	from	a	gradual	economic	recovery	in	Ukraine	and	a	return	to	formats	
for	business	and	political	cooperation,	such	as	business	forums	and	inter-
governmental	commissions	for	economic	cooperation.	However,	an	essen-
tial	precondition	for	the	development	of	economic	cooperation	between	the	
countries	of	Central	Europe	and	Ukraine	is	that	the	authorities	in	Kyiv	will	
undertake	an	effective	fight	against	corruption,	and	improve	transparen-
cy,	stability	and	the	enforceability	of	rights.	
•	Relations	with	the	V4	states	are	not	a	priority	in	Ukraine’s	foreign	policy.	
For	Kyiv,	cooperation	with	the	more	powerful	states,	perceived	as	key	play-
ers	in	NATO	and	the	EU	(especially	the	US,	Germany	and	France)	has	tradi-
tionally	been	of	primary	importance.	This	approach,	as	observed	over	the	
last	25	years,	became	particularly	 clear	 in	2014	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	armed	
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conflict	with	Russia	in	the	Donbas	and	the	deep	financial	crisis.	Kyiv	sees	
the	V4	primarily	as	a	useful	 forum	to	help	 in	 lobbying	for	Ukrainian	 in-
terests	within	the	EU	and	NATO.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	less	interested	in	
using	the	Visegrad	Group	as	a	platform	for	strengthening	regional	or	bilat-
eral	cooperation.	This	approach	is	partly	related	to	a	lack	within	Ukraine	of	
experts	who	are	interested	in	Central	Europe,	and	the	resulting	low	level	
of	knowledge	about	the	political	and	economic	processes	in	the	countries	of	
the	region.
•	Since	the	revolution	in	Ukraine	in	2014,	the	new	authorities	in	Kyiv	have	not	
taken	much	serious	action	to	intensify	their	political	cooperation	with	the	
Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary.	It	was	only	at	the	turn	of	2017	that	
Kyiv	appointed	new	ambassadors	to	the	capitals	of	those	countries,	accom-
panied	by	messages	about	the	need	to	activate	bilateral	relations.	In	the	case	
of	relations	with	the	Czech	Republic,	there	is	a	lack	of	relevant	topics	for	co-
operation,	and	so	the	Visegrad	group	remains	the	main	platform	for	their	
political	contacts.	Bratislava	is	seen	in	Kyiv	as	an	ally;	in	questions	related	
to	natural	gas.	Slovakia	guarantees	Ukraine’s	gas	supplies	from	the	West,	
and	both	countries	strive	to	remain	the	key	transit	countries	for	Russian	
gas	supplies	to	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	however,	there	is	a	perception	in	
Ukraine	that	the	main	interlocutors	on	this	matter	are	Berlin	and	Brussels.	
For	the	same	reason,	Ukraine	has	not	regained	the	trust	of	the	Slovak	gov-
ernment,	which	was	already	seriously	compromised	during	the	gas	crisis	
of	2009.	In	turn,	Ukraine’s	bilateral	relations	with	Hungary	are	dominated	
by	the	question	of	Budapest’s	policy	towards	the	Hungarian	minority	in	the	
Transcarpathian	region.	Although	Kyiv	has	maintained	a	restrained	tone	
at	the	highest	political	and	diplomatic	level	towards	Hungary’s	initiatives,	
this	subject	is	often	presented	in	the	Ukrainian	media	as	a	threat	to	the	ter-
ritorial	integrity	of	the	state.
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I. CzeCh RepublIC’s polICy towaRds ukRaIne
Two	trends	can	be	discerned	in	the	Czech	government’s	approach	to	Ukraine.	
On	 the	 one	hand,	 Prague	 sees	 the	war	 in	 eastern	Ukraine	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	
region’s	 security,	 including	 the	 risk	 of	mass	migration	 to	Central	 Europe.	 In	
this	context,	 the	Czech	government	 is	 trying	 to	contribute	 to	 the	stability	of	
Ukraine	by	supporting	reform	there,	and	has	been	involved	in	EU	and	NATO	
efforts	to	discourage	Russia	from	destabilising	the	situation	in	Ukraine.	On	the	
other	hand,	Prague	is	trying	to	minimise	the	losses	that	the	war	in	Ukraine	has	
brought	to	Czech-Russian	economic	cooperation	by	ensuring	that	good	contacts	
are	being	maintained,	at	least	at	the	level	of	the	ministers	responsible	for	the	
economy.	For	PM	Bohuslav	Sobotka,	the	priority	in	foreign	policy	is	to	maintain	
the	cohesion	of	the	EU	and	NATO,	including	with	regard	to	Russia;	this	is	why	
he	has	accepted	the	development	of	Czech-Russian	economic	cooperation	only	
within	the	limits	of	the	EU’s	consensus.	In	practice,	this	means	that	Prague’s	
position	is	linked	with	that	of	Germany	and	other	key	players	in	the	EU.	
President	Miloš	Zeman	has	been	actively	pursuing	a	policy	of	Czech-Russian	
cooperation	which	is	independent	of	the	government.	He	is	a	strong	opponent	
of	the	sanctions	and	favours	a	multi-faceted	dialogue	with	Russia;	he	believes	
that	Russia	is	not	a	threat,	just	a	natural	ally	of	the	West	in	the	fight	against	
Islamic	fundamentalism.	The	Czech	president	has	acknowledged	that	the	an-
nexation	of	Crimea	was	unlawful,	but	added	that	in	his	opinion	the	decision	
by	Nikita	Khrushchev	to	transfer	Crimea	to	the	Ukrainian	Soviet	Socialist	Re-
public	was	a	mistake.	Zeman	has	called	Ukraine	a	failed	state	in	his	statements,	
has	undermined	the	democratic	transition	taking	place	there,	and	has	accused	
the	government	in	Kyiv	of	favouring	war.	These	statements	by	the	Czech	head	
of	state	have	raised	protests	from	the	Ukrainian	embassy	in	Prague,	and	are	
regularly	cited	by	Russian	media.	A	position	close	to	that	put	forward	by	Rus-
sian	propaganda	on	the	question	of	sanctions	and	the	situation	in	Ukraine	has	
also	been	adopted	by	politicians	 from	the	Communist	Party	of	Bohemia	and	
Moravia	(KSČM)	and	the	Freedom	&	Direct	Democracy	party	(SPD),	as	well	as	
by	some	politicians	in	the	co-ruling	Czech	Social	Democratic	Party	(ČSSD).	In	
January	2016	Czech	communists	visited	the	so-called	‘Donetsk	People’s	Repub-
lic’	to	obtain	information	about	the	‘crimes	of	the	Ukrainian	army’.	One	Czech	
deputy	from	the	SPD	went	to	Crimea	to	participate	in	the	commemorations	of	
the	third	anniversary	of	Russia’s	seizure	of	the	peninsula.	
Prague	began	 to	be	more	 intensely	 interested	 in	Ukraine	and	 the	EU’s	 east-
ern	neighbourhood	after	the	Czech	Republic	joined	the	EU.	The	Czech	Republic	
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was	 an	 active	 promoter	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership	 programme,	which	was	
launched	 during	 the	 Czech	 presidency	 of	 the	 EU	 Council	 in	 2009.	 In	 2012,	
Ukraine	was	also	regarded	as	one	of	the	priority	areas	in	the	long-term	strat-
egy	 of	 Czech	 export,	 as	 a	 market	 with	 potential	 which	 had	 hitherto	 been	
underexploited	by	Czech	business.	 In	 response	 to	 the	Russian	aggression	 in	
Ukraine,	the	Czech	government	immediately	criticised	the	violation	of	inter-
national	law,	but	avoided	any	steps	that	could	have	negatively	affected	its	coop-
eration	with	Russia.	Back	in	autumn	2014,	PM	Sobotka	criticised	the	EU	sanc-
tions,	maintaining	that	they	were	an	inefficient	and	costly	instrument;	he	also	
argued	that	it	was	necessary	to	ensure	that	“Russia	does	not	feel	threatened	
by	ambitions	 to	 expand	 the	EU	and	NATO”.	The	views	of	 the	Czech	govern-
ment	have	gradually	 changed	since	 then,	mainly	under	 the	 influence	of	 the	
German	approach	to	sanctions.	Another	important	factor	in	the	re-evaluation	
of	Czech	policy	towards	Ukraine	and	Russia	was	Prague’s	assumption	of	 the	
annual	presidency	of	the	Visegrad	Group	in	July	2015,	thanks	to	which	Czech	
diplomacy	felt	obliged	to	boost	confidence	in	Central	Europe	after	a	series	of	
disagreements	caused	by	the	various	approaches	taken	by	the	region’s	states	
towards	the	Ukrainian-Russian	war.	
A	significant	proportion	of	Czech	politicians	and	businessmen	who	have	ex-
perience	in	dealing	with	the	post-Soviet	states	tend	to	regard	Ukraine	as	a	tra-
ditional	Russian	zone	of	 interest.	This	approach	 is	 characterised	 in	particu-
lar	by	President	Zeman	and	some	politicians	on	the	left,	and	also	quite	often	
by	entrepreneurs	who	have	been	active	on	the	Eastern	European	markets	for	
years.	From	their	perspective,	the	Russian	market	has	always	been	a	priority	
compared	to	that	of	Ukraine,	and	was	characterised	by	more	readily	compre-
hensible	rules.	In	Prague,	the	loudest	supporters	of	Ukraine	gaining	independ-
ence	from	Russia	are	first	and	foremost	the	opposition	right-wing	circles	gath-
ered	around	the	former	foreign	minister	Karel	Schwarzenberg	and	his	party	
TOP	09,	as	well	as	the	Christian	Democrats	(KDU-ČSL)	who	are	one	part	of	the	
ruling	coalition.	Much	activity	in	support	of	Ukrainian	interests	in	the	Czech	
Republic	also	comes	from	non-governmental	organisations,	whose	work	often	
includes	representatives	of	the	Ukrainian	minority.
Bilateral	 political	 cooperation	 between	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 Ukraine	 is	
dominated	by	contacts	at	the	foreign	ministry	level.	There	is	sporadic	secto-
ral	cooperation	in	other	government	departments	(internal	affairs,	economy,	
culture),	but	for	many	years	Czech-Ukrainian	political	contacts	have	not	dealt	
with	strategic	issues,	and	remain	at	a	lower	level.	Since	the	Maidan	there	has	
not	been	a	single	Czech-Ukrainian	visit	at	the	presidential	or	prime	ministerial	
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level.	The	last	meeting	of	this	type	took	place	during	President	Zeman’s	visit	to	
Kyiv	during	the	Yanukovych	government	in	October	2013.	For	this	reason,	the	
EU	and	V4	summits	in	which	Ukraine	participates	play	an	important	role	in	
maintaining	 contacts	 at	 the	highest	 level	 and	 in	 the	 formation	of	 the	Czech	
Republic’s	Eastern	policy.
1. ukrainians in the Czech Republic
The	Czech	Republic	has	had	positive	experiences	with	its	community	of	Ukrain-
ians,	which	numbers	about	110,000	(according	to	Czech	data	from	2016);	they	
have	 integrated	with	Czech	society	without	any	major	problems.	 It	 is	main-
ly	economic	migrants	who	come	to	the	Czech	Republic;	official	data	refers	to	
about	42,000	Ukrainian	workers	(the	most	numerous	group	of	foreigners	on	
the	labour	market	after	Slovaks)	and	23,000	Ukrainians	conducting	economic	
activity.	Under	the	influence	of	the	economic	downturn	in	the	Czech	Repub-
lic	 since	2008,	 the	number	of	Ukrainian	employees	 fell	by	half,	 although	 in	
the	last	two	years	it	has	been	rising	again.	Ukrainian	citizens	are	also	in	the	
forefront	of	foreigners	studying	at	Czech	universities.	The	Czech	government	
was	a	strong	supporter	of	the	EU’s	visa	liberalisation	for	Ukrainians	(and	Geor-
gians).	During	the	negotiations	between	the	EU	and	Turkey	in	the	context	of	
the	migration	crisis,	Prague	was	strongly	opposed	to	any	idea	that	the	require-
ments	for	Turkey	in	terms	of	the	abolition	of	visas	would	be	lower	than	in	the	
case	of	Ukraine.	
In	connection	with	the	sustained,	record	low	unemployment	rate	in	the	Czech	
Republic	(3.2%	in	April	2017,	according	to	Eurostat),	Czech	entrepreneurs	have	
been	putting	pressure	on	the	government	to	allow	an	influx	of	more	workers	
from	Ukraine	(among	other	countries)	onto	the	Czech	labour	market.	Until	the	
economic	crisis,	the	Czech	Republic	had	conducted	a	liberal	migration	policy,	
but	 in	2008	it	almost	ceased	 issuing	work	permits	 to	 foreign	nationals	 from	
outside	the	EU.	In	addition,	the	law	prevents	Czech	employment	agencies	from	
hiring	employees	 from	outside	the	EU.	On	the	other	hand,	Czech	 law	allows	
the	employment	of	such	workers	if	they	have	been	referred	from	employment	
agencies	 in	other	EU	countries,	a	 loophole	which	Polish	companies	often	ex-
ploit.	In	practice,	however,	many	of	the	companies	registered	in	Poland	which	
send	Ukrainians	to	work	in	the	Czech	Republic	either	bend	or	violate	the	very	
restrictive	Czech	legislation.	In	addition,	the	Czech	migration	police,	based	on	
the	provisions	governing	the	residence	of	foreigners	from	non-EU	countries,	
usually	 state	 that	 only	permits	 issued	by	 the	Czech	 government	 allow	 such	
people	to	work	in	the	Czech	Republic.
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The	Czech	policy	of	 limiting	 the	 influx	of	 foreign	workers	 is	 in	part	a	result	
of	 the	strong	 influence	of	 the	country’s	 trade	unions,	which	have	convinced	
the	government	 that	 importing	 foreign	workers	will	maintain	 low	wages	 in	
the	Czech	Republic.	On	the	other	hand,	this	policy	is	also	associated	with	the	
strong	anti-immigrant	mood	 in	Czech	society,	which	has	also	heated	up	 the	
electoral	campaign	in	recent	months	before	general	elections	in	October	2017.	
As	a	result,	the	decisive	influence	on	the	shape	of	the	migration	policy	is	wield-
ed	by	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	which	has	been	ignoring	the	needs	of	the	
labour	market.	By	a	decision	of	the	minister	Milan	Chovanec,	there	have	been	
more	inspections	of	companies	regarding	their	employment	of	foreigners,	as	
well	as	more	patrols	in	municipalities	which	have	complained	to	the	govern-
ment	about	having	problems	with	foreign	workers.
The	Czech	Republic	issues	work	permits	to	foreigners	from	non-EU	countries	
in	the	form	of	a	uniform	residence	permit,	and	assigns	them	jobs	through	the	
Visapoint	information	system.	Due	to	its	overload	and	inefficiency,	the	stand-
ard	practice	in	Ukraine	is	to	use	the	services	of	companies	which	help	in	ob-
taining	visas,	which	often	involves	breaking	the	law	(for	example	by	engaging	
in	corruption	or	counterfeiting	documents).	Under	pressure	from	employers’	
organisations,	 the	Czech	government	 is	 gradually	 increasing	 the	number	of	
consular	workers	in	Ukraine,	and	has	created	a	 legal	way	to	circumvent	the	
Visapoint	 system,	 enabling	 companies	 to	 bring	 employees	 pre-selected	 in	
Ukraine	into	the	country	more	quickly.	However,	this	simplified	system	can	
only	cover	a	maximum	of	800	workers	per	month,	which	can	improve	the	situ-
ation	on	the	labour	market	to	only	a	limited	degree.	
Stringent	rules	concerning	the	employment	of	foreigners	have	inclined	some	
Czech	entrepreneurs	to	employ	Ukrainian	citizens	through	Polish	companies.	
The	 vast	majority	 of	 these	 people	 have	 Polish	 visas	 for	 short-term	work,	 is-
sued	within	the	framework	of	the	so-called	claims	system,	and	they	are	sent	to	
the	Czech	Republic	by	Polish	employment	agencies.	Some	of	these	Ukrainian	
workers	are	also	employed	in	the	Czech	Republic	as	representatives	of	Polish	
employers.	Ukrainians	working	in	the	Czech	Republic	who	have	Polish	visas	
have	often	been	expelled	from	the	Czech	Republic	by	the	migration	police	on	
charges	of	lacking	the	correct	work	permits.
2. energy and the economy
Against	the	background	of	the	other	Central	European	states,	the	question	of	
maintaining	the	transit	of	Russian	gas	via	Ukraine	is	of	minor	importance	to	
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the	Czech	government.	Secure	gas	supplies	are	guaranteed	for	the	country	by	
extensive	connections	with	its	neighbours,	especially	Germany.	The	Czech	au-
thorities	have	been	avoiding	any	criticism	of	the	Nord	Stream	project,	which	
will	transport	Russian	gas	to	the	EU	bypassing	Ukraine.	PM	Bohuslav	Sobot-
ka	did	sign	a	letter	from	the	heads	of	government	of	nine	Central	and	Eastern	
European	countries	to	the	European	Commission	referring	to	Nord	Stream	2	
in	critical	 terms	(March	2016),	but	 this	was	a	one-off	gesture	which	has	not	
been	followed	up	by	any	further	declarations.	In	fact,	Czech	government	rep-
resentatives	 have	 highlighted	 the	 potential	 benefits	 for	 the	 Czech	 Republic	
from	implementing	Nord	Stream	2,	namely	an	expected	rise	in	gas	to	be	trans-
ferred	via	the	Czech	Republic.	In	this	respect,	the	Czech	transmission	operator	
Net4Gas	plans	to	increase	gas	imports	from	Germany	and	to	increase	its	ability	
to	export	gas	in	conjunction	with	Slovakia.	These	activities	are	part	of	the	logic	
of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Nord	Stream	project	2;	 in	 fact,	 they	will	 allow	
Russian	gas	to	be	redistributed	in	Central	Europe	without	having	to	transport	
it	via	Ukraine.	
After	 two	years	of	collapse	(2014-2015),	Czech-Ukrainian	trade	flows	аrе	be-
ginning	 to	 approach	 the	 levels	 they	 were	 at	 before	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	
war,	thanks	to	growing	exports	from	the	Czech	Republic.	In	2016,	the	Czech	
Republic	exported	goods	to	Ukraine	worth	around	€800	million,	an	increase	
of	42%	on	 the	previous	year,	 although	 this	 is	 still	 about	a	 third	 less	 than	 in	
2013.	Despite	the	collapse	of	trade	in	Ukraine,	it	is	mainly	those	companies	that	
had	good	business	contacts	even	during	the	Yanukovych	government	which	
have	 remained	active.	These	 include	MND,	which	 cooperates	with	Gazprom	
and	owns	deposits	of	gas	in	Western	Ukraine,	and	Škoda	Auto,	which	in	March	
began	production	of	the	Kodiaq	model	in	its	Ukrainian	factory.	Economic	co-
operation	has	been	further	boosted	by	the	resumption	of	business	and	politi-
cal	contacts.	In	June	2017,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Ukraine	organised	the	first	
meeting	in	five	years	of	an	intergovernmental	commission	on	economic,	scien-
tific	and	technical	cooperation.
Economic	cooperation	with	Ukraine	is	of	very	limited	importance	for	the	Czech	
economy,	whose	priority	market	 in	Eastern	Europe	remains	Russia.	The	an-
nexation	of	Crimea	and	the	aggravation	of	fighting	in	eastern	Ukraine	led	the	
Czech	government	to	limit	its	economic	contacts	with	the	Kremlin;	for	exam-
ple,	 intergovernmental	meetings	on	scientific,	 technical	and	economic	coop-
eration	were	put	on	hold.	Over	time,	however,	Prague	returned	to	the	coopera-
tion	formats	it	had	held	with	Russia	prior	to	the	Russian-Ukrainian	war,	and	is	
currently	looking	for	ways	to	reverse	the	negative	trends	in	the	two	countries’	
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mutual	trade.	Over	the	past	four	years,	the	value	of	Czech-Russian	trade	has	
fallen	by	more	than	40%	(in	2016	it	amounted	to	about	€6	billion).	Although	the	
figures	for	the	first	months	of	2017	show	the	first	increase	in	exports	to	Russia	
in	some	years,	it	still	represents	only	1.8%	of	total	Czech	exports.	Czech	compa-
nies	are	seeking	opportunities	to	expand	into	the	Russian	market	for	building	
production	 facilities	 in	Russia	 (most	 recently	 the	 car	 lighting	manufacturer	
Brisk	and	the	machining	centre	manufacturer	Trimill	have	 taken	this	deci-
sion),	which	would	allow	them	to	reduce	the	administrative	burden.
3. Czech support for ukraine
The	 Czech	 Republic	 was	 conducting	 an	 active	 policy	 of	 transformation	 and	
development	 in	Ukraine	even	before	 the	Maidan,	 and	 in	 recent	years	 it	has	
increased	 its	commitments	 in	 this	country.	The	value	of	projects	 in	Ukraine	
supported	 by	 Czech	 government	 money	 was	 around	 €6	 million	 in	 the	 pe-
riod	2014-16.	As	for	development	aid,	the	Czechs	are	focusing	on	support	for	
Ukrainian	education,	including	helping	the	government	in	Kyiv	with	reforms,	
supporting	Ukrainian	universities	in	managing	EU	programmes,	and	helping	
schools	and	colleges	evacuated	from	the	war	zone.	The	Czech	embassy	in	Kyiv	
is	coordinating	donors	in	the	field	of	education.	The	list	of	Czech	priorities	also	
includes	aid	for	the	Ukrainian	health	system	and	for	internal	refugees,	as	well	
as	support	for	independent	media.	Czech	non-governmental	organisations	are	
also	very	active	in	Ukraine;	one	of	the	largest,	Člověk v tísni	(People	in	need),	
has	been	working	in	Ukraine	for	15	years	to	help	Ukrainians	on	both	sides	of	
the	front.	In	2015	it	spent	nearly	€12	million	on	this.
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II. slovakIa’s polICy towaRds ukRaIne
The	Slovak	government	has	two	main	objectives	in	the	context	of	Ukraine:	to	
maintain	 stability	 there,	particularly	 to	 avoid	a	humanitarian	crisis;	 and	 to	
maintain	the	stable	transit	of	oil	and	natural	gas	at	the	highest	possible	levels	
to	Slovakia	via	Ukraine’s	territory.	The	cabinet	of	PM	Robert	Fico	has	declared	
its	 full	 support	 for	Ukrainian	ambitions	 to	 join	 the	EU,	and	 is	 committed	 to	
supporting	 the	 transformation	of	 the	Ukrainian	economy	and	 the	reform	of	
sectoral	policies.	At	the	same	time,	the	Slovak	government	has	avoided	criti-
cising	Russia	for	its	aggression	towards	Ukraine,	and	is	careful	to	maintain	its	
very	good	political	relations	and	close	energy	cooperation	with	the	Kremlin.	
Its	pro-Russian	rhetoric	is	partly	dictated	by	the	expectations	of	the	elector-
ate	of	the	co-ruling	Smer-SD	party,	which	Fico	leads.	The	double-track	Eastern	
policy	of	the	Slovak	government,	on	the	one	hand,	has	resulted	in	criticism	of	
EU	sanctions	against	Russia,	but	on	the	other	hand,	it	has	been	accompanied	by	
actions	which	assist	Ukraine	and	strike	at	the	Kremlin’s	interests	(such	as	the	
reverse	flow	of	gas	on	the	Slovak-Ukraine	border).
Unlike	 the	 government,	 President	 Andrej	 Kiska	 has	 openly	 described	 the	
Kremlin’s	policy	 towards	Ukraine	 (and	Georgia)	as	a	 threat	 to	 international	
security.	During	a	visit	to	Kyiv	in	May	2015,	the	Slovak	president	said	that	Slo-
vakia	“will	never	recognise	the	illegal	annexation	of	Crimea,	and	will	never	
accept	 any	 political,	military	 or	 economic	 interference	 in	 Ukrainian	 sover-
eignty”.	This	is	one	of	the	permanent	priorities	in	Slovak	foreign	policy,	namely	
respect	for	international	law,	and	not	consenting	to	the	revision	of	boundaries.	
This	position	derives,	among	other	things,	from	the	fact	that	a	Hungarian	mi-
nority	of	around	460,000	people	live	in	the	south	of	the	country.
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	war,	 Slovakia	 exerted	 great	 re-
straint	 in	 its	 reactions	 to	 the	 conflict,	 above	all	with	 regard	 to	 its	 economic	
cooperation	with	 Russia.	 Since	 autumn	 2014	 (see	 below	 for	 a	 description	 of	
the	activation	of	the	Vojany–Uzhhorod	pipeline),	Fico’s	cabinet	has	invested	in	
improving	political	relations	with	Kyiv,	paying	somewhat	less	attention	to	the	
Kremlin’s	position	in	this	regard;	this	attitude	has	resulted	from	pressure	from	
the	EC	and	the	United	States,	among	others.	The	rapprochement	between	Slo-
vakia	and	Ukraine	also	comes	from	both	states’	opposition	to	the	Nord	Stream	
2	gas	pipeline	project;	Bratislava	and	Kyiv	both	perceive	it	as	a	threat	to	their	
interests.	Slovak	support	for	Ukraine	is	also	gradually	extending	to	other	ar-
eas;	during	the	NATO	summit	in	Warsaw,	Slovakia	committed	itself	to	leading	
the	NATO	Trust	Fund	for	the	destruction	of	explosive	materials	in	Ukraine.	
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The	challenge	for	Slovak-Ukrainian	relations	is	the	criticism	of	the	EU’s	sanc-
tions	against	Russia	regularly	repeated	by	the	Slovak	prime	minister.	 In	his	
talks	with	his	Ukrainian	counterparts,	Fico	has	indeed	declared	that	the	Slo-
vak	position	remains	 in	 line	with	the	EU	consensus	(the	 lifting	of	sanctions	
is	conditional	on	implementation	of	the	Minsk	agreements).	However,	at	the	
same	time,	he	does	not	conceal	his	opinion	 that	sanctions	are	an	 ineffective	
and	harmful	 instrument.	 Slovakia,	 together	with	Hungary	 and	other	 coun-
tries,	has	called	for	political	discussions	within	the	EU	on	sanctions.	In	June	
2016,	the	Slovak	foreign	minister	Miroslav	Lajčák	argued	that	the	question	is	
not	about	the	lifting	of	sanctions,	but	rather	about	avoiding	a	situation	where	
while	formally	maintaining	them,	“each	country	signs	big	treaties	with	Rus-
sia,	visits	[Russia],	and	meets	people	on	the	black	list	[i.e.	those	covered	by	the	
sanctions]”.	Statements	by	members	of	the	Slovak	government	have	long	ex-
pressed	increasing	annoyance	that,	on	the	one	hand,	Germany,	the	EC	and	the	
US	have	been	putting	pressure	on	Slovakia	to	limit	its	economic	contacts	with	
Russia,	while	on	the	other	hand,	the	larger	states	have	been	conducting	dia-
logue	and	business	with	Russia	without	any	major	obstacles.	At	the	same	time	
Slovakia	has	acknowledged	that	the	Minsk	agreements	are	the	only	sensible	
means	for	bringing	an	end	to	the	conflict,	and	that	their	rapid	implementation	
is	in	the	interest	of	all	parties.	The	possibility	that	the	Russian-Ukrainian	war	
would	be	transformed	into	a	frozen	conflict	would	be	a	very	bad	turn	of	events	
for	Slovakia.
Bratislava	is	looking	for	ways	to	develop	cooperation	with	Moscow,	despite	the	
obstacles	and	difficulties	in	relations	between	the	EU	and	Russia.	The	Slovak	
government	maintains	that	Russia	should	not	be	treated	as	an	enemy	or	a	threat	
to	the	West	or	NATO,	and	has	emphasised	that	none	of	the	world’s	problems	
can	be	solved	without	Moscow.	Despite	a	number	of	pro-Russian	gestures,	Slo-
vakia	has	limited	the	number	of	areas	in	which	Moscow	could	put	pressure	on	
it.	It	has	guaranteed	the	possibility	of	alternative	(to	Russia)	energy	supplies,	
and	is	gradually	replacing	its	old	Russian	military	equipment	with	hardware	
from	the	West.	The	Slovak	government	wants	to	develop	economic	cooperation	
with	Russia,	including	in	the	strategic	areas	of	supply	and	transit	of	oil	and	gas;	
however,	it	is	taking	care	to	ensure	that	it	will	have	a	readily	available	alterna-
tive	in	each	of	these	areas.	
Slovak	politicians	have	become	strongly	involved	in	work	on	the	modernisa-
tion	of	Ukraine,	including	the	main	contributors	to	the	liberal	reforms	at	the	
turn	of	the	21st	century.	The	former	prime	minister	Mikuláš	Dzurinda	has	acted	
as	an	advisor	 to	President	Poroshenko,	and	the	 former	prime	minister	 Iveta	
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Radičová	was	involved	in	a	project	for	the	decentralisation	of	Ukraine	carried	
out	by	the	Community	of	Democracies.	Former	finance	minister	Ivan	Mikloš,	
on	the	occasion	of	the	change	of	government	in	Ukraine	in	2016,	even	received	
a	proposal	 to	become	 that	country’s	finance	minister;	 eventually	he	became	
the	head	of	a	group	of	advisers	to	the	Ukrainian	prime	minister,	and	was	also	
co-chair	(along	with	Leszek	Balcerowicz)	of	the	Group	of	Strategic	Consultants	
to	Support	Reform,	whose	task	is	to	provide	substantive	scientific	support	for	
the	president	and	the	government.	Regardless	of	the	results	achieved	by	these	
politicians’	 work	 in	 Kyiv,	 their	media	 activity	 in	 Ukraine	 and	 Slovakia	 has	
helped	greatly	in	building	a	climate	of	bilateral	cooperation.	
The	development	of	Slovak-Ukrainian	cooperation	has	also	been	aided	by	the	in-
volvement	of	regional	authorities	on	both	sides	of	the	border.	In	both	cases	this	
concerns	peripheral	and	under-funded	regions,	which	is	why	the	Slovak	local	
authorities	 have	 also	 taken	 the	 opportunity	 to	 increase	 the	 attractiveness	 of	
eastern	Slovakia	in	cooperation	with	Ukraine.	The	border	regions	have	invested	
high	hopes	in	the	launch	of	visa-free	travel,	but	they	maintain	that	irrespective	
of	this	step,	 it	would	be	worth	simplifying	the	local	border	traffic	regime	and	
increasing	its	area	to	extend	as	much	as	100	kilometres	from	the	border.	
1. the economy and energy
Trade	with	Ukraine	generates	only	0.6%	of	Slovakia’s	trade	(according	to	Slovak	
data	 from	2016).	This	figure	 is	 overshadowed	by	Slovakia’s	 trade	with	Russia,	
which	itself	 is	 far	from	substantial;	at	€4	billion,	 it	represents	only	3%	of	Slo-
vakia’s	total	trade	turnover.	At	the	political	 level,	attempts	are	admittedly	be-
ing	made	to	revive	Slovak-Ukrainian	economic	cooperation,	although	these	re-
main	sporadic.	 In	2015,	the	countries’	economy	ministers	discussed	resuming	
the	work	of	the	Slovak-Ukrainian	intergovernmental	commission	for	economic,	
industrial	and	scientific	&	technical	cooperation,	the	last	meeting	of	which	took	
place	in	2015.	However,	no	date	for	a	new	meeting	has	so	far	been	announced.
From	the	perspective	of	Slovakia,	Ukraine	is	primarily	seen	as	a	state	of	par-
ticular	importance	for	the	security	of	energy	supply	from	the	East.	The	Brat-
stvo	gas	pipeline	and	the	southern	strand	of	the	Druzhba	oil	pipeline	run	via	
both	countries;	these	play	a	key	role	in	the	system	of	transporting	Russian	en-
ergy	carriers	to	Western	Europe.	This	infrastructure	is	not	only	important	for	
Slovakia	with	 regard	 to	 energy	 security;	 it	 also	brings	 the	 country	 tangible	
financial	benefits	 (the	Slovak	transmission	operator’s	annual	revenues	 from	
gas	transit	are	estimated	at	close	to	€800	million).	
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Cooperation	between	Slovakia	and	Ukraine	in	the	area	of	energy	has	widened	
significantly	in	the	last	three	years,	but	it	still	remains	charged	with	a	large	
degree	of	mutual	distrust.	This	results	 from	the	negative	experiences	of	 the	
period	in	2006	when	the	supply	of	Russian	gas	to	Ukraine	was	interrupted,	and	
above	all	from	the	crisis	of	2009,	when	Slovakia	suffered	severely	as	a	conse-
quence	of	the	Russian-Ukrainian	dispute.	On	the	one	hand,	PM	Fico’s	cabinet	
of	the	time	lost	any	illusions	that	good	relations	with	Russia	would	ensure	sta-
ble	gas	deliveries	to	Slovakia;	and	on	the	other,	it	was	confirmed	in	the	belief	
that	Ukraine	 is	 an	unreliable	partner	because	of	 the	negative	 experience	of	
Slovakia’s	cooperation	with	Kyiv	during	the	crisis.
The	consequence	of	the	low	level	of	trust	between	Bratislava	and	Kyiv	was	a	dis-
pute	(which	lasted	more	than	a	year)	around	the	idea	of	activating	a	so-called	
‘large’	 gas	 reverse	flow	on	 the	Slovak-Ukrainian	border.	Ukraine	demanded	
that	 the	reverse	supplies	be	activated	at	 the	Bratstvo	transit	gas	pipeline	(at	
the	Veľké	Kapušany	border	point),	and	saw	the	lack	of	progress	from	Slovakia	
in	this	field	as	an	element	of	Bratislava’s	pro-Russian	policy.	For	its	part,	the	
Slovak	government	argued	 that	 activating	a	 ‘large’	 reverse	flow	was	 impos-
sible	from	a	legal	point	of	view,	due	to	the	country’s	existing	contractual	ob-
ligations	with	Gazprom	and	the	Ukrainian	side’s	 lack	of	control	over	 transit	
(Gazprom	does	not	provide	Ukraine	with	the	full	transit	information,	i.e.	the	
shipper	codes).	Currently	 this	dispute	has	been	muted,	although	 it	has	been	
agreed	that	talks	on	the	‘large’	reverse	flow	will	continue	with	the	participa-
tion	of	the	European	Commission.
A	compromise	solution	to	the	question	of	reverse	gas	supplies	from	Slovakia	
to	Ukraine	arose	in	the	form	of	the	activation	of	the	Vojany–Uzhhorod	pipe-
line	in	autumn	2014.	This	connector	enables	deliveries	at	the	level	of	14.6	bcm	
per	year,	more	than	Ukraine’s	entire	gas	imports	in	2016	(11	bcm).	The	reverses	
at	Ukraine’s	connectors	with	Hungary	and	Poland	have	 lower	capacities	 (6.1	
and	1.4	bcm	respectively),	and	they	cannot	guarantee	stability	of	supply	due	to	
their	intermittent	mode	of	operation.	This	means	that	cooperation	with	Slova-
kia	has	become	a	key	element	of	Ukraine’s	policy	to	ensure	the	security	of	its	
gas	supplies.	This	is	particularly	important	in	the	context	of	Kyiv’s	halt	to	the	
purchase	of	Russian	gas	in	November	2015.	Currently	Ukraine	is	relying	solely	
on	domestic	production	and	imports	of	gas	from	the	West.	
The	theme	that	brought	the	governments	of	Slovakia	and	Ukraine	together	in	
2015	was	their	common	opposition	to	the	plans	to	construct	the	Nord	Stream	2	
gas	pipeline.	It	is	in	the	common	interest	of	Slovakia	and	Ukraine	to	maintain	
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the	 transit	 of	 Russian	 gas	 via	 Bratstvo	 pipeline,	 which	 is	 the	 main	 supply	
route	for	Russian	gas	to	the	EU	(it	runs	from	Russia	via	Ukraine	to	Slovakia	
and	the	Czech	Republic;	the	gas	pipeline	has	branches	running	from	Ukraine	
to	Hungary	and	Moldova).	For	this	reason,	not	only	the	politicians	in	Bratis-
lava	and	Kyiv,	but	also	the	transmission	system	operators	from	both	countries	
(Slovakia’s	Eustream	and	Ukraine’s	Ukrtranshaz)	have	adopted	strong	stances	
against	plans	to	ship	Russian	gas	to	the	West	while	avoiding	Ukraine	(and	Slo-
vakia).
The	 Slovak-Ukrainian	 opposition	 to	 the	 Nord	 Stream	 project	 2,	 however,	 is	
based	on	fragile	foundations.	This	is	because	Bratislava,	in	contrast	to	Kyiv,	is	
avoiding	confrontation	with	Russia	in	this	context,	as	it	has	mainly	criticised	
those	Western	companies	which	are	cooperating	with	Gazprom.	Both	the	Slo-
vak	government	and	Eustream	are	negotiating	intensively	with	Russia	on	the	
question	of	 the	perspectives	 for	 the	transit	of	Russian	gas	via	Slovakia	after	
Nord	Stream	2	has	been	constructed.	The	evolution	of	the	Slovak	government’s	
position	over	the	past	year	is	the	probable	result	of	these	talks.	The	Slovak	au-
thorities	have	gradually	ceased	public	criticism	of	the	project	to	build	a	new	
gas	pipeline	via	the	Baltic	Sea.	At	the	same	time	the	Slovak	operator,	in	order	
to	minimise	its	losses	after	the	implementation	of	Nord	Stream	2,	has	begun	
to	pursue	investments	which	can	be	considered	as	an	adaptation	to	the	new	
directions	of	gas	transfer	which	will	apply	after	Nord	Stream	2	has	been	com-
pleted.	At	the	beginning	of	2017	Eustream	decided	to	build	a	fifth	compressor	
station,	which	will	allow	gas	transmission	from	West	to	East	to	be	increased,	
and	make	it	easier	to	redistribute	gas	from	Nord	Stream	2	in	Central	Europe.
An	 important	 step	 in	 creating	 the	 perspective	 of	 strengthening	 Slovak-
Ukrainian	energy	cooperation	was	a	letter	of	intent	from	Eustream,	Ukraine’s	
Naftohaz	&	Ukrtranshaz,	and	the	Italian	operator	Snam	on	their	common	as-
sessment	of	opportunities	for	cooperation	in	the	development	and	use	of	the	
Ukrainian	pipeline	network,	which	was	 signed	 in	April	2017.	The	 letter	was	
a	clear	signal	confirming	 the	Slovak	company’s	 interest	 in	cooperating	with	
Ukraine	on	gas	transit.	At	the	same	time,	it	can	be	read	as	sounding	out	what	
the	EU	operators’	options	might	be	regarding	the	privatisation	of	 the	future	
operator	of	Ukraine’s	pipelines.	 Slovakia	 is	 also	playing	an	 increasingly	 im-
portant	role	in	sharing	its	experiences	of	reforming	the	electricity	market	in	
Ukraine.	Within	the	framework	of	the	V4	Road	Show	project,	initiated	by	the	
Visegrad	Group	in	2014,	Slovakia	has	organised	a	number	of	conferences	and	
training	 courses	 designed	 to	 share	 its	 experiences,	 primarily	 in	 the	 area	 of	
energy	 efficiency.	 Since	March	 2016,	 Slovakia’s	 energy	 regulatory	 authority	
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(ÚRSO)	has	shared	its	experience	in	implementing	the	Third	Energy	Package	
as	part	of	a	two-year	twinning	project	with	Ukraine.	Bratislava	has	also	pro-
posed	that,	in	the	context	of	the	cooperation	between	the	European	Network	of	
Transmission	Systems	Operators	for	Electricity	(ENTSO-E)	and	Ukraine,	it	is	
ready	to	offer	its	expertise	in	synchronising	Slovakia’s	network	with	the	Euro-
pean	system	of	electricity	transmission	networks	(UCTE).
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III. hungaRy’s polICy towaRds ukRaIne
Hungary’s	policies	 towards	Ukraine	are	shaped	by	two	main	factors:	coop-
eration	between	Hungary	and	Russia,	which	the	government	of	Viktor	Or-
bán	treats	as	a	matter	of	priority;	and	the	issue	of	the	Hungarian	minority	
in	Ukraine.	Hungary	primarily	sees	the	Ukrainian-Russian	conflict	and	the	
cooling	of	 relations	between	 the	West	and	Russia	as	an	obstacle	 in	 the	de-
velopment	of	its	own	economic	cooperation	with	Russia.	Although	Ukraine	
is	Hungary’s	largest	neighbour	(it	is	larger	than	the	other	six	neighbouring	
states	combined)	Budapest	has	not	devised	a	comprehensive	political	strat-
egy	towards	the	country,	focusing	instead	on	the	fate	of	Ukraine’s	Hungar-
ian	minority	in	Transcarpathia,	which	numbers	around	150,000.	In	the	first	
months	after	the	Revolution	of	Dignity,	serious	tensions	arose	in	Hungarian-
Ukrainian	relations;	since	then,	however,	political	relations	have	stabilised,	
and	there	has	been	a	progressive	development	of	sectoral	cooperation	in	en-
ergy	and	the	economy,	as	well	as	the	stirrings	of	political	support	from	Hun-
gary	for	the	changes	in	Ukraine.
Hungary’s	policies	towards	Ukraine	largely	come	down	to	actions	taken	with-
in	multilateral	formats	(mainly	the	EU	and	the	V4).	Hungary	supports	the	de-
velopment	of	the	EU’s	policy	towards	the	eastern	neighbourhood	(within	the	
framework	of	 the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	the	Eastern	Partner-
ship).	Hungary’s	priority,	however,	is	the	region	of	the	Western	Balkans,	and	it	
is	focusing	the	efforts	of	its	diplomacy	there.	Budapest	is	also	involved	in	sup-
porting	Ukraine	within	the	framework	of	the	activities	of	the	Visegrad	Group.	
Ukraine	is	not	high	on	the	list	of	priorities	of	Hungarian	development	aid,	and	
it	has	primarily	been	targeting	its	funding	at	the	region	inhabited	by	the	Hun-
garian	minority.	
1. ukraine in the shadow of hungarian-Russian relations
For	years	Hungarian	diplomacy	has	prioritised	the	country’s	relationship	with	
Russia	above	relations	with	Ukraine.	Due	primarily	to	 the	 important	role	of	
Russian	raw	materials	for	the	Hungarian	economy,	both	left-	and	right-wing	
governments	 in	 Budapest	 have	 given	 relations	 with	 Moscow	 high	 priority.	
Hungarian-Russian	 cooperation	has	deepened	during	 the	 rule	 of	Viktor	Or-
bán,	 who	 treats	 Russia	 as	 a	 key	 economic	 and	 political	 partner	 within	 the	
framework	of	the	strategy	announced	in	2010	entitled	 ‘Opening	to	the	East’.	
The	 intensity	 of	Hungarian-Russian	 contacts	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	Or-
bán’s	meetings	with	Putin,	which	have	taken	place	at	least	annually	since	2013.
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The	Ukrainian-Russian	conflict	erupted	at	 the	height	of	economic	coopera-
tion	between	Hungary	and	Russia.	An	agreement	to	expand	the	Paks	nuclear	
power	 plant	 in	 Hungary,	 a	 flagship	 Hungarian-Russian	 project,	 was	 con-
cluded	in	January	2014.	The	Hungarian	authorities	decided	(without	holding	
a	tender)	to	entrust	its	construction	to	Rosatom,	and	they	plan	to	finance	the	
investment	from	a	Russian	loan	of	€10	billion.	The	construction	of	the	new	
nuclear	block	 is	 scheduled	 for	 the	period	2018-2026,	and	 the	repayment	of	
the	loan	will	last	until	2047.	The	long-term	nature	of	this	investment	will	lead	
to	a	deepening	of	Hungary’s	political	and	financial	dependency	on	Russia	for	
several	decades.
Since	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	 gas	 crises	 (in	 2006	 and	 2009),	 Hungary	 has	
sought	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 supply	 route	 for	 Russian	 gas	 to	 Hungary	 which	
would	serve	as	an	alternative	to	the	transit	through	Ukraine.	After	the	fail-
ure	 of	 the	 South	 Stream	project,	 Budapest	 has	 been	 looking	 for	 an	 oppor-
tunity	for	Russian	gas	to	be	transmitted	from	Turkey	via	the	Balkans	from	
the	planned	Turkish	Stream	gas	pipeline.	Orbán’s	government	is	developing	
close	relations	with	Russia	on	the	basis	of	the	priorities	of	the	country’s	en-
ergy	policy,	but	also	with	a	view	to	obtaining	 immediate	political	benefits.	
In	2013-2014	Gazprom	twice	lowered	its	gas	prices	for	Hungary,	which	was	
a	key	part	of	Fidesz’s	re-election	in	2014	(reducing	energy	prices	for	house-
holds	was	Orbán’s	main	election	slogan).
Donald	Trump’s	rise	to	power	in	the	USA	has	strengthened	Budapest’s	hopes	
that	 the	sanctions	policy	will	be	reversed	and	 that	 there	will	be	a	return	 to	
‘business	as	usual’	in	relations	with	Russia.	As	it	waits	for	that	moment,	Hun-
gary	is	being	careful	to	maintain	its	intensive	political	contacts	with	Moscow,	
hoping	to	minimise	the	braking	effect	on	economic	cooperation	(in	2016	Hun-
garian	exports	were	about	40%	less	than	in	2013).	In	this	way	the	Hungarian	
government	is	trying	at	least	to	maintain	its	current	position	on	the	Russian	
market	 (as	 it	 competes	with	other	European	 companies,	 such	as	 those	 from	
Germany	and	Austria,	which	are	 consistently	active	 in	Russia),	hoping	as	 it	
does	so	that	the	Kremlin	will	appreciate	these	gestures	from	Budapest	when	
the	sanctions	are	lifted	and	the	economic	crisis	in	Russia	has	blown	over.	The	
Hungarian	 government	 has	 invested	 much	 more	 effort	 in	 developing	 eco-
nomic	contacts	with	Russia	(for	example	by	holding	regular	meetings	of	 the	
intergovernmental	 economic	 commission,	 and	 the	 intensive	 development	
of	political	and	business	contacts	with	the	Russian	regions)	than	it	has	with	
Ukraine,	 despite	 the	 similar	 importance	 of	 both	markets	 for	Hungary’s	 ex-
ports	(c.	€1.4	billion	in	2016	each).
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2. hungary on the Russian-ukrainian conflict
Due	 to	 its	 close	 relationship	with	 Russia,	 from	 the	 beginning	Hungary	 has	
emphasised	its	distance	from	the	Russian-Ukrainian	conflict.	Although	it	con-
demned	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	has	expressed	support	for	the	sovereign-
ty	and	territorial	integrity	of	Ukraine,	it	has	however	opposed	holding	Russia	
responsible	for	its	aggression.	Although	Hungary	voted	for	the	imposition	and	
extension	of	EU	sanctions	on	Russia,	Prime	Minister	Orbán	has	openly	and	re-
peatedly	challenged	the	rationality	of	their	implementation,	and	stressed	the	
costs	to	the	Hungarian	economy,	calling	it	“a	shot	in	the	foot”.	Since	spring	2016	
Hungary	has	called	for	a	discussion	on	sanctions	at	the	European	Council	level,	
and	has	criticised	 the	 fact	 that	decisions	on	extending	 the	sanctions	will	be	
taken	‘automatically’	at	the	level	of	the	EU	Council.	
Despite	official	support	for	the	sovereignty	of	Ukraine,	rhetoric	similar	to	the	
Russian	narrative	on	the	Ukrainian-Russian	conflict	is	popular	in	Fidesz	cir-
cles.	Both	the	Hungarian	government	and	the	media	linked	to	the	ruling	party	
have	pointed	out	 that	 in	essence	 it	 is	 a	Russian-American	conflict.	They	use	
the	expressions	‘the	Ukraine	crisis’,	‘civil	war’	or	‘fratricidal	war’	in	reference	
to	the	war	in	the	Donbas,	avoiding	any	direct	mention	of	Russian	aggression.	
This	is	in	contrast	to	Fidesz’s	earlier	line;	back	in	2008	Orbán	sharply	criticised	
Russia	 for	 its	 aggression	 towards	Georgia,	which	he	 compared	 to	 the	Soviet	
intervention	in	Hungary	in	1956.	The	Hungarian	media,	particularly	pro-gov-
ernment	sources,	have	dedicated	very	little	space	to	the	Maidan	protests,	the	
annexation	of	Crimea	or	the	war	in	Syria.	If	they	have	discussed	these	topics,	
they	have	focused	on	the	position	of	the	Hungarian	minority	in	Ukraine,	and	
particularly	on	whether	soldiers	from	the	Hungarian	minority	should	be	par-
ticipating	in	‘a	war	that	is	not	theirs’.	
In	the	first	few	months	after	the	outbreak	of	the	Ukrainian-Russian	conflict,	
Hungary	implemented	a	series	of	actions	and	gestures	which	were	unfavour-
able	to	the	new	authorities	in	Kyiv.	In	May	2014,	during	the	campaign	for	elec-
tions	to	the	European	Parliament,	Orbán	called	for	the	Hungarian	minority	to	
be	granted	autonomy	in	Ukraine.	This	met	with	an	extremely	critical	reaction	
in	Kyiv,	 and	was	 seen	as	an	action	aimed	at	destabilising	a	 state	which	was	
struggling	with	aggression.	In	September	2014,	three	days	after	President	Or-
bán	met	Aleksei	Miller,	the	head	of	Gazprom,	Hungary	suspended	gas	reverses	
to	Ukraine	for	four	months	(arguing	that	it	needed	to	fill	its	own	gas	reserves).	
Other	unfriendly	gestures	included	the	nomination	in	2014	as	Hungary’s	am-
bassador	 in	 Ukraine	 of	 Ernő	 Keskeny,	 the	 chief	 architect	 of	 the	Hungarian	
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‘opening	to	the	East’	and	an	advocate	of	rapprochement	with	Russia.	According	
to	Hungarian	media,	Keskeny	was	responsible	for	a	key	meeting	between	Or-
bán	and	Putin	in	2009,	which	refocused	the	former’s	attitude	towards	Russia	
a	few	months	before	Fidesz	took	power.	
At	 the	 turn	 of	 2015	 Hungary	 made	 attempts	 to	 improve	 its	 relations	 with	
Ukraine.	This	involved	a	general	correction	in	foreign	policy	after	the	ostenta-
tious	emphasis	on	its	close	relations	with	Russia,	the	rhetorical	undermining	
of	 the	West’s	unity	 concerning	Russia,	 and	 the	unfriendly	gestures	 towards	
Ukraine	which	led	to	the	deterioration	of	relations	with	Hungary’s	traditional	
partners	in	the	West.	Orbán’s	government	mainly	tried	to	improve	its	relations	
with	Washington,	which	in	autumn	2014	underwent	their	greatest	crisis	since	
1989	(including	the	prohibition	of	a	group	of	Hungarian	officials	from	entering	
the	United	States).	Budapest’s	stance	towards	Kyiv	was	also	influenced	by	pres-
sure	from	Berlin,	which	sought	a	unified	EU	policy	towards	Russia	in	this	pe-
riod.	The	desire	to	improve	relations	with	Poland	was	also	of	relevance,	as	their	
deterioration	had	adversely	shaped	the	two	states’	cooperation	in	the	Visegrad	
Group,	which	was	important	for	Budapest.	As	a	result,	after	a	tumultuous	first	
few	months,	Hungary	developed	correct	bilateral	relations	with	the	Ukrain-
ian	government	which	was	voted	in	in	2014.	This	improvement	was	aided	by	
the	frequent	meetings	between	PM	Orbán	and	President	Poroshenko	(within	
the	framework	of	bilateral	visits,	and	on	the	sidelines	of	the	European	People’s	
Party	congresses),	as	well	as	regular	contacts	at	 lower	 levels	of	government.	
Hungary	has	muted	 its	 demands	 for	 autonomy	 for	 the	Hungarian	minority,	
and	in	January	2015	it	resumed	the	reverse	transmission	of	gas	to	Ukraine	af-
ter	a	few	months’	break.	
The	rebuilding	of	trust	in	Hungarian-Ukrainian	relations	has	been	hindered	
by	the	Hungarian	government’s	ambiguous	rhetoric	towards	Ukraine.	On	the	
one	hand,	Orbán	has	stressed	that	the	existence	of	an	independent,	democratic	
and	prosperous	Ukraine	is	in	Hungary’s	interest;	but	on	the	other,	he	has	ex-
pressed	his	scepticism	regarding	the	country’s	future,	the	prospects	for	its	eco-
nomic	development,	and	the	state	of	the	rule	of	law	there.	Orbán’s	statements	
often	manifest	deprecating	attitudes	towards	Kyiv.	In	a	speech	to	Hungarian	
ambassadors	 in	 February	2016	he	 stressed	 that	 it	was	 in	Hungary’s	 interest	
that	 there	 “should	be	 something”	between	Hungary	and	Russia,	 “which,	 for	
example,	could	be	called	Ukraine”.	He	has	pointed	out	that	Hungary	should	not	
get	caught	up	in	any	international	anti-Russian	coalition	because	of	Ukraine.	
Press	 conferences	held	after	meetings	between	Orbán	&	Putin	have	become	
an	opportunity	for	the	Russian	president	to	attack	Ukraine	and	demonstrate	
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the	divisions	and	weaknesses	of	the	EU	and	NATO,	and	Putin’s	speeches	do	not	
meet	with	any	opposition	from	Orbán.
However,	 the	building	 of	 good	 relations	between	Hungary	 and	Ukraine	has	
been	aided	by	Hungary’s	support	for	Ukraine	in	the	EU	and	NATO.	Hungary,	
along	with	the	other	Visegrad	Group	states,	pushed	for	the	soonest	possible	ab-
olition	of	EU	visas	to	Ukraine	(thus	working	also	in	the	interests	of	the	Ukrain-
ian	Hungarians).	As	part	of	its	activities	under	the	banner	of	NATO,	Budapest	
has	donated	€100,000	to	the	NATO-Ukraine	Cyber	Defence	Trust,	which	was	
created	on	the	basis	of	a	decision	taken	at	the	2014	summit	in	Wales.	Hunga-
ry	has	also	participated	 in	 the	Defence	Education	Enhancement	Programme	
(DEEP)	for	Ukraine.
Hungary	has	also	offered	material	support	to	Ukraine,	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent	
than	most	countries	in	the	region.	Every	year	about	20	Ukrainian	soldiers	are	
accepted	for	treatment	in	Hungarian	hospitals.	Thanks	to	the	support	of	the	
Hungarian	government,	hundreds	of	 children	of	 injured	and	killed	Ukrain-
ian	soldiers	have	spent	holidays	in	Hungary	in	the	past	two	years.	Hungary’s	
government	and	citizens	have	also	given	financial	support	to	NGOs	providing	
humanitarian	aid	in	Ukraine	(about	200	tonnes	per	year).	
3. areas of cooperation with ukraine
Even	 before	 the	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	 and	 the	 Ukrainian-Russian	 conflict,	
Hungary	had	 activated	gas	 reverse	flow	on	 an	 interconnector	with	Ukraine	
(March	2013).	This	allows	it	to	deliver	gas	at	the	level	of	6.1	bcm	per	year,	al-
though	 the	 actual	 transmission	 volume	 is	 much	 smaller,	 for	 technical	 rea-
sons	 among	 other	 factors	 (it	 operates	 in	 interruptible	mode).	The	 operation	
of	 this	 interconnector	became	the	subject	of	 tensions	between	Hungary	and	
Ukraine	when	in	November	2014	Budapest	completely	halted	its	gas	deliveries	
to	Ukraine.	This	gave	rise	to	a	range	of	suspicions	of	cooperation	between	Hun-
gary	and	Russia	targeted	against	Ukraine	(the	halt	in	the	supply	was	preceded	
by	a	meeting	between	the	head	of	Gazprom	and	PM	Orbán).	In	January	2015,	
however,	Hungary	resumed	the	deliveries,	and	a	few	months	later	the	Hungar-
ian	 transmission	system	operator	FGSZ	entered	 into	an	agreement	with	 the	
Ukrainian	operator	Ukrtranshaz	which	adapted	the	rules	for	their	cooperation	
on	the	interconnector	to	conform	with	EU	regulations	(the	so-called	Intercon-
nection	Agreement).	In	theory,	the	agreement	allows	gas	to	be	traded	within	
a	so-called	virtual	reverse	flow	(backhaul	service),	as	it	has	introduced	regu-
lations	in	full	compliance	with	the	so-called	Third	Energy	Package.	However,	
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Gazprom	still	does	not	provide	Ukraine	with	full	transit	data	(shipping	codes),	
thereby	preventing	the	implementation	of	the	virtual	reverse	service.	
Hungary	has	expressed	cautious	opposition	to	the	plans	to	construct	the	Nord	
Stream	 2	 pipeline.	 In	March	 2016,	 the	 prime	ministers	 of	 nine	 Central	 and	
Eastern	European	countries	criticized	this	project	in	a	letter	to	the	European	
Commission.	However,	Prime	Minister	Orbán	has	consistently	avoided	mak-
ing	any	public	statements	on	this	issue,	as	have	the	members	of	his	cabinet.	The	
Hungarian	criticism	of	Nord	Stream	2	has	boiled	down	mostly	 to	highlight-
ing	the	hypocrisy	of	the	European	Commission,	which	has	blocked	the	South	
Stream	project	but	has	not	shown	a	similar	determination	in	relation	to	Nord	
Stream	2.	Nevertheless,	Hungary	 is	 taking	measures	which	may	hinder	 the	
distribution	in	the	region	of	gas	from	Nord	Stream	2.	The	Hungarian	energy	
regulatory	authority	MEKH	has	halted	the	capacity	auctions	at	the	intercon-
nectors	with	Austria	and	Slovakia	for	the	period	after	2019.	MEKH	has	argued	
its	decision	on	the	basis	of	the	market’s	uncertainty	at	the	plans	to	build	Nord	
Stream	2	and	the	possible	suspension	of	the	transit	of	Russian	gas	via	Ukraine.	
In	 recent	 months	 the	 Hungarian	 government	 has	 attempted	 to	 strengthen	
its	economic	cooperation	with	Ukraine.	November	2016	saw	the	Hungarian-
Ukrainian	Business	Forum	in	Debrecen,	which	was	attended	by	the	two	coun-
tries’	prime	ministers.	For	the	Hungarian	economy,	the	main	driving	force	of	
which	 is	exports,	 the	big	Ukrainian	market	 is	an	attractive	destination.	Be-
tween	2009	and	2013	trade	almost	doubled,	and	Ukraine	has	become	Hunga-
ry’s	 third	 largest	 export	market	outside	 the	EU	 (after	 the	United	States	 and	
Russia).	After	the	collapse	of	trade	as	a	result	of	the	economic	crisis	in	Ukraine	
in	the	years	2014-15,	2016	has	seen	a	renewed	increase	in	trade	flows.	The	larg-
est	Hungarian	investor	in	Ukraine,	the	OTP	bank,	again	started	to	make	prof-
its	in	Ukraine	in	2016	after	recording	significant	losses	in	2014-15	(about	€250	
million).	
Hungary	 and	 Ukraine	 are	 trying	 to	 revive	 their	 cross-border	 cooperation,	
which	has	been	neglected	in	recent	years.	This	matter	is	of	great	importance	for	
the	Hungarian	government	in	particular,	as	it	wants	to	facilitate	contacts	be-
tween	Hungary	and	the	Hungarian	minority	in	Ukraine,	which	resides	mostly	
in	the	border	areas.	The	local	authorities	of	Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg	county	in	
Hungary	and	the	Transcarpathian	region	of	Ukraine	have	strengthened	their	
cooperation	in	the	field	of	border	infrastructure	(the	modernisation	of	border	
crossings	and	bridges	over	the	river	Tisza,	which	marks	the	border).	In	2016,	
Hungary	offered	Ukraine	a	 loan	of	€50	million	to	be	spent	on	the	expansion	
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of	the	road	network	in	the	Transcarpathian	region.	The	Budapest	government	
also	plans	to	run	a	motorway	up	to	the	Ukrainian	border	by	2020.	This	inten-
sive	cooperation	between	Hungary	and	Ukraine	(as	well	as	Slovakia	and	Ro-
mania)	also	includes	the	management	of	the	upper	Tisza	river,	the	wetlands	of	
which	are	located	on	the	border	between	these	countries.	
4. hungary’s policy towards the hungarian minorities in ukraine
Although	 the	Hungarians	 in	Ukraine	 are	not	 the	 largest	 ethnic	minority	 in	
that	 country	 (they	number	 about	 150,000	people,	 or	0.3%	of	 the	population	
of	 Ukraine),	 nor	 the	 largest	 Hungarian	minority	 inhabiting	 the	 neighbour-
ing	countries,	they	are	the	key	topic	 in	Budapest’s	relations	with	Kyiv.	Hun-
gary’s	policy	towards	national	minorities	is	one	of	the	leading	areas	of	its	di-
plomacy.	In	recent	years	Hungarian	governments	have	formulated	a	number	
of	demands	concerning	the	Hungarian	minority	which	have	been	the	subject	
of	contention	in	relations	with	Ukraine:	1)	the	granting	of	cultural	autonomy	
to	the	Transcarpathian	Hungarians;	2)	to	demarcate	an	electoral	constituency	
which	would	include	municipalities	inhabited	mostly	by	Hungarians;	3)	allow-
ing	them	to	hold	dual	citizenship.	Budapest	has	protested	strongly	against	the	
emerging	proposals	for	changes	in	the	Ukrainian	legislation	concerning	lan-
guage	and	education,	and	has	accused	Kyiv	of	preventing	Budapest	from	imple-
menting	its	policy	towards	the	Hungarian	minority.	Hungary	has	set	the	issue	
of	Kyiv’s	compliance	with	the	rights	of	the	Hungarian	minority	as	a	condition	
of	 its	 further	 support	 for	Ukraine	on	 international	 fora.	 It	has	also	 stressed	
that	 in	the	absence	of	agreement	on	the	Hungarian	minority	at	the	bilateral	
level,	Budapest	will	seek	to	transfer	this	dispute	to	the	level	of	the	EU.	
The	Hungarian	demand	for	cultural	autonomy	for	the	Hungarians	in	Ukraine	
is	part	of	the	policy	which	Budapest	is	also	conducting	with	regard	to	its	other	
neighbours.	Soon	after	the	outbreak	of	fighting	between	the	Ukrainian	army	
in	the	Donbas	and	the	separatists	supported	by	Russia,	PM	Orbán	called	upon	
the	Ukrainian	government	 to	 extend	 the	 scope	of	 the	Hungarian	minority’s	
rights	in	May	2014.	Although	he	did	not	give	any	details	regarding	the	scope	
of	this	autonomy,	his	phrasing	–	suggesting	that	respect	for	the	rights	of	the	
national	minorities	was	at	risk	under	the	new	Ukrainian	government	–	was	
received	in	Kyiv	as	being	part	of	the	rhetoric	coming	from	Russia,	which	was	
conducting	its	aggression	towards	Ukraine	under	the	pretext	of	protecting	mi-
nority	rights.	Under	the	influence	of	criticism	by	Kyiv,	as	well	as	other	Europe-
an	capitals,	Budapest’s	demands	for	autonomy	have	been	muted,	although	the	
Hungarian	government	has	sometimes	expressed	support	for	the	autonomous	
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aspirations	of	the	Hungarian	minority,	calls	which	meet	with	immediate	pro-
tests	from	the	Ukrainian	foreign	ministry.
Another	unresolved	point	of	contention	is	the	case	of	Hungarian	citizenship	for	
the	Hungarians	in	Ukraine.	The	simplified	path	for	granting	Hungarian	citi-
zenship,	which	has	been	in	effect	since	2011,	is	a	flagship	project	of	Orbán’s	gov-
ernment,	serving	the	stated	aim	of	‘the	reintegration	of	the	nation	beyond	the	
borders	of	the	state.’	According	to	the	Hungarian	authorities,	70%	of	Ukrainian	
Hungarians	had	received	Hungarian	citizenship	as	of	November	2016.	Buda-
pest’s	promotion	of	the	policy	of	members	of	Hungarian	minority	taking	Hun-
garian	citizenship	has	caused	little	controversy	in	Kyiv	(albeit	quite	large	in	
the	Transcarpathian	region).	Although	the	Constitution	of	Ukraine	prohibits	
the	possession	of	dual	citizenship,	there	are	no	legal	provisions	which	would	
have	any	consequences	for	a	citizen	who	has	the	nationality	of	another	state.	
When	signals	appeared	in	2017	about	a	forthcoming	bill	to	regulate	the	status	
of	dual	citizenship	in	Ukraine,	the	Hungarian	government	began	to	demand	
the	conclusion	of	a	bilateral	agreement	which	would	guarantee	the	Hungarian	
minority	the	right	to	hold	dual	citizenship.	
Hungary’s	 attitude	 towards	 the	Maidan	and	 the	Ukrainian	authorities	 after	
2014	is	burdened,	among	other	factors,	by	the	Hungarian	minority’s	negative	
experiences	with	the	governments	of	those	politicians	who	came	to	power	af-
ter	the	Orange	Revolution.	In	2004,	in	return	for	support	of	his	candidacy	for	
the	presidency,	Viktor	Yushchenko	promised	 a	 series	 of	 concessions	 for	 the	
Hungarian	minority	which,	however,	were	not	implemented.	In	turn,	the	Ty-
moshenko	government	introduced	changes	in	2009	which	caused	difficulties	
in	the	teaching	of	the	Hungarian	language,	which	the	then	leftist	government	
in	Hungary	protested.	Hungarians	also	feared	nationalist	tendencies	in	the	po-
litical	opposition	to	the	Party	of	Regions.	
The	problems	in	Hungarian-Ukrainian	relations	are	affected	by	the	fact	that,	
from	Kyiv’s	perspective,	the	Hungarian	minority’s	rights	are	largely	related	to	
those	of	 the	Russian-speaking	population	of	Ukraine.	Hungary	 received	 the	
law	on	languages	adopted	during	Yanukovych’s	presidency	in	2012	positively,	
as	it	allowed	Hungarian	to	be	admitted	as	an	additional	official	language	in	the	
region	inhabited	by	the	Hungarian	minority	–	regardless	of	the	fact	that	the	
main	aim	of	the	then	government	in	Kyiv	was	to	give	the	Russian	language	the	
right	of	a	parallel	official	 language	 in	most	regions	of	Ukraine.	The	Hungar-
ian	foreign	ministry	sharply	protested	the	repeal	of	 this	Act	by	the	Ukrain-
ian	parliament	two	days	after	Yanukovych	fled	Kyiv	and	the	dominant	role	of	
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the	Ukrainian	language	was	reinstated.	Although	the	repeal	of	the	language	
law	was	blocked	by	the	then	acting	president	of	Ukraine,	for	a	long	time	the	
Hungarian	authorities	saw	the	attempt	to	repeal	it	as	proof	of	the	new	Ukrain-
ian	government’s	negative	 attitude	 towards	 the	national	minorities.	Moreo-
ver,	Orbán’s	government	has	heavily	publicised	the	few	nationality-based	inci-
dents	which	have	taken	place	since	2014	(such	as	the	vandalising	of	Hungarian	
monuments).	
The	Hungarian	minority,	which	inhabits	a	compact	area	in	the	Transcarpathi-
an	region	on	the	border	with	Hungary,	has	relatively	broad	rights	in	the	field	of	
education	and	culture	in	the	Hungarian	language.	Over	a	hundred	primary	and	
secondary	schools	operate	in	which	instruction	is	given	in	Hungarian.	Higher	
education	is	conducted	in	Hungarian	at	the	Uzhhorod	State	University	and	the	
Hungary-funded	 Ferenc	 Rákóczi	 II	 Transcarpathian	Hungarian	 Institute	 in	
Berehovo.	However,	the	implementation	of	legislation	concerning	minorities	
remains	a	problem,	mainly	due	to	the	lack	of	financial	resources.	Ukrainian	
Hungarians	are	at	present	primarily	struggling	with	the	same	problems	(re-
lated	to	the	difficult	economic	situation)	as	the	rest	of	Ukraine’s	inhabitants.	
The	Hungarians	are	among	the	best-organised	national	minorities	in	Ukraine.	
The	Transcarpathian	Hungarians	achieved	substantial	successes	in	recent	lo-
cal	elections	(October	2015)	because,	thanks	to	the	mediation	of	the	Hungarian	
government,	the	two	Hungarian	minority	parties	(which	have	been	competing	
against	each	other	since	the	1990s)	put	forward	 joint	candidates	 in	some	re-
gions	for	the	first	time.	The	alliance	of	these	parties	won	8	of	the	64	seats	in	the	
Transcarpathian	Regional	Council.	They	also	have	one	deputy	in	the	Ukrain-
ian	parliament.	An	activist	from	the	Hungarian	minority	in	Transcarpathia,	
Andrea	Bocskor,	was	elected	on	Fidesz’s	list	as	a	member	of	the	European	Par-
liament	in	2014.
Nevertheless	the	Hungarian	minority	(with	the	support	of	the	government	in	
Budapest)	is	still	unsuccessfully	trying	to	have	a	single-mandate	constituency	
created	 in	which	Hungarians	would	 constitute	 a	majority.	This	would	allow	
them	to	send	a	deputy	representing	the	Hungarian	minority	to	the	parliament.	
Although	a	deputy	from	the	Hungarian	minority	has	actually	been	returned	
to	the	Ukrainian	Parliament	in	recent	years,	each	time	this	has	required	an	
agreement	between	the	Hungarian	minority	and	the	dominant	party	at	any	
given	time;	 in	2012,	a	representative	of	 the	Hungarian	minority	was	chosen	
from	the	list	of	the	Party	of	Regions,	and	in	2015	from	the	list	of	the	Poroshenko	
Bloc	(László	Brenzovics).	
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Since	the	outbreak	of	the	Maidan	protests,	the	Russian-Ukrainian	conflict	and	
the	economic	crisis	in	Ukraine,	aid	from	Budapest	for	the	Hungarian	minor-
ity	in	Transcarpathia	has	increased.	Hungarian	government	representatives	
have	stressed	that	the	Transcarpathian	Hungarians	are	“at	present	the	most	
vulnerable	part	of	 the	Hungarian	nation”.	 In	addition	to	 their	 long-standing	
policy	of	support	for	Hungarian-language	education,	cultural	institutions	and	
associations,	Budapest	is	sending	more	and	more	material	aid	to	the	Transcar-
pathian	Hungarians.	This	includes	humanitarian	aid	(e.g.	food	for	children),	
but	the	Hungarian	state	–	in	the	face	of	Ukraine’s	economic	difficulties	–	has	
also	been	paying	allowances	for	teachers,	doctors,	priests	and	journalists	be-
longing	to	the	Hungarian	minority.	Hungary	has	also	allotted	funding	for	the	
renovation	of	hospitals	and	schools	in	Transcarpathia.	
In	2016,	the	Hungarian	government	launched	a	programme	to	fund	companies	
and	entrepreneurs	in	Transcarpathia	(a	similar	programme	is	being	conduct-
ed	in	the	Vojvodina	of	Serbia,	which	is	also	inhabited	by	numerous	Hungarian	
communities).	In	2017	Hungary	reserved	around	€17	million	for	non-refunda-
ble	loans,	as	well	as	around	€60	million	for	low-interest	loans	for	businesses.	
As	the	government	has	announced,	the	aim	of	this	programme	is	to	improve	
the	economic	situation	of	the	Transcarpathian	Hungarians	and	thus	discour-
age	them	from	emigrating;	this	 is	part	of	the	general	objective	of	Budapest’s	
Hungarian	minority	policy,	which	 is	 for	Hungarian	minorities	 to	 remain	 in	
their	‘homeland’. 
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Iv. ukRaIne’s polICy towaRds the CzeCh 
RepublIC, slovakIa and hungaRy
In	Ukraine’s	foreign	policy,	relations	with	the	V4	states	do	not	have	top	prior-
ity.	For	Kyiv,	cooperation	with	strong	and	rich	states,	as	well	as	the	perceived	
key	players	in	NATO	and	the	EU	(particularly	the	United	States,	Germany	and	
France),	 has	 traditionally	 been	 of	 primary	 importance.	This	 attitude,	 as	 ob-
served	over	the	last	25	years,	was	particularly	highlighted	in	2014,	in	a	situa-
tion	of	armed	conflict	with	Russia	in	the	Donbas	and	the	deep	financial	crisis.	
Positive	solutions	(as	Kyiv	sees	it)	to	both	these	problems	can	primarily	be	im-
plemented	through	active	diplomatic	actions	in	the	capitals	of	those	countries	
and	in	Brussels	(by	the	EU).	The	goal	of	these	activities	is	to	keep	the	pressure	
on	Moscow,	and	to	ensure	that	these	states	(and	thus	the	EU	and	NATO)	contin-
ue	their	support	for	Ukraine.	In	this	context,	Kyiv’s	efforts	in	the	EU	and	NATO	
are	focused	on	three	fundamental	issues.	First,	ensuring	the	continuation	of	
financial	and	technical	assistance	from	Western	donors.	Secondly,	retaining	
their	political	support,	which	is	seen	as	supporting	sectoral	sanctions	against	
Russia	and	maintaining	the	Minsk	agreements	as	the	main	document	regulat-
ing	the	resolution	of	the	Donbas	conflict.	And	thirdly,	getting	Gazprom’s	con-
struction	of	Nord	Stream	2	blocked.	Visa	 liberalisation	with	the	EU	was	an-
other	priority	for	the	Ukrainian	government	until	spring	2017,	when	Brussels	
ultimately	set	a	date	to	lift	visas	for	Ukrainian	citizens.	From	Kyiv’s	point	of	
view,	the	main	aim	of	its	political	relations	with	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary	
and	Slovakia,	both	bilaterally	as	well	as	in	the	V4+Ukraine	format,	is	to	con-
vince	those	countries’	leaders	to	lobby	on	behalf	of	Ukraine’s	political	and	eco-
nomic	interests	in	NATO	and	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	Kyiv	tends	to	pay	much	
less	attention	to	bilateral	(economic,	social	and	cross-border)	cooperation	with	
its	Western	neighbours.	This	attitude	results	from	the	low	priority	these	issues	
have,	compared	to	the	military	and	economic	challenges	the	country	has	been	
facing	since	2014,	as	well	as	a	shortage	of	financial	resources,	and	also	often	
the	lack	of	substantive	potential	and	political	will	to	implement	initiatives	in	
the	areas	mentioned	above.	Concomitantly,	 the	V4’s	 importance	 for	Ukraine	
depends	on	the	strength	of	each	of	this	format’s	members	on	the	international	
stage,	 as	well	 as	 its	 relations	with	various	 capitals,	first	 and	 foremost,	with	
Berlin	and	Washington.	
In	the	 immediate	aftermath	of	the	Revolution	of	Dignity	 in	Ukraine	in	2014,	
the	new	authorities	in	Kyiv	took	no	action	to	intensify	the	cooperation	with	the	
Czech	Republic.	This	country	is	now	seen	in	Ukraine	as	a	supportive	state	(with	
the	exception	of	its	president,	Miloš	Zeman),	but	one	which	has	little	influence	
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on	the	policies	of	the	EU	and	NATO	in	those	areas	which	are	crucial	for	Kyiv.	
For	 this	 reason,	 Kyiv	 does	 not	 assign	 particular	 importance	 to	 its	 relations	
with	Prague,	and	the	main	platform	for	the	two	countries’	political	contacts	
remains	the	Visegrad	group.	Within	this	association,	Ukraine	is	committed	to	
lobbying	for	its	interests	in	the	EU	and	NATO.
The	 dynamics	 of	 bilateral	 relations	 between	 Ukraine	 and	 Slovakia	 is	much	
greater	because	of	 their	 common	border,	 through	which	 the	pipeline	 repre-
senting	 the	main	 transit	 route	of	Russian	gas	 to	Europe	runs.	 In	Kyiv’s	per-
spective,	 it	 is	cooperation	 in	 the	area	of	gas	which	 is	 the	main	subject	 in	 its	
relations	with	Bratislava.	The	image	of	Slovakia	in	Ukraine	has	been	improved	
by	the	involvement	of	former	Slovak	politicians	in	the	process	of	economic	re-
forms	in	Ukraine.	On	the	other	hand,	bilateral	relations	have	been	made	more	
difficult	by	the	discrepancy	seen	in	Kyiv	between	the	approach	of	Slovakia’s	
prime	minister	(who	is	considered	to	be	a	pro-Russian	politician)	and	that	of	
its	president	(who	has	criticised	Russia’s	aggressive	policies)	to	their	country’s	
relations	with	Ukraine.	
Presidents	Poroshenko	and	Kiska	met	on	 the	Slovak-Ukrainian	border	on	 11	
June,	where	they	symbolically	‘opened	the	gates’	to	Europe	on	the	occasion	of	
the	start	of	visa-free	travel	between	Ukraine	and	the	EU.	Kyiv	probably	saw	the	
choice	of	this	section	of	the	EU	border	as	the	most	neutral.	Against	the	back-
drop	of	the	conflict	over	politics	of	memory	in	Ukraine’s	relations	with	Poland,	
the	tension	concerning	minority	rights	in	the	Transcarpathian	region	in	rela-
tions	with	Hungary,	and	the	traditionally	cool	relations	with	Romania	(which	
is	not	a	member	of	the	Schengen	zone),	the	pro-Ukrainian	President	Kiska	was	
seen	by	 the	government	 in	Kyiv	as	 a	 safe	partner	who	would	not	 cause	any	
controversy.	For	these	reasons,	it	cannot	be	excluded	that,	in	the	campaign	be-
fore	 the	parliamentary	and	presidential	elections	 in	2019	already	underway	
in	Ukraine,	the	government	in	Kyiv	will	focus	on	visa	liberalisation	as	a	major	
success	of	its	policy	of	bringing	the	country	closer	to	Europe,	and	Slovakia	will	
be	portrayed	as	Ukraine’s	principal	advocate	in	the	EU.
Kyiv	sees	Bratislava	as	an	ally	on	the	issue	of	guaranteeing	the	transit	of	Rus-
sian	gas	via	Ukraine	and	Slovakia.	At	the	same	time,	however,	there	is	a	per-
ception	in	Ukraine	that	the	main	players	in	this	matter	are	Berlin	and	Brussels.	
This	is	another	reason	why	Ukraine	has	not	regained	the	trust	of	the	Slovak	
government,	which	was	seriously	undermined	during	the	gas	crisis	in	2009.	
Regardless,	Bratislava’s	consent	to	activate	the	Vojany–Uzhhorod	pipeline	sig-
nificantly	helped	Ukraine	to	reduce	the	import	of	from	Russia	in	2015,	and	to	
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opt	out	of	it	completely	in	2016	and	2017.	In	2016,	Ukraine	imported	9.1	bcm	of	
gas	via	Slovakia,	85%	of	its	total	imports.	In	the	face	of	a	drop	in	demand	for	gas	
in	Ukraine	(due	to	the	economic	crisis	and	the	adoption	of	a	more	realistic	price	
on	the	domestic	market),	Kyiv	has	ceased	raising	the	issue	of	the	activation	of	
the	so-called	‘big	reverse’	on	the	main	grid	interconnector.	Previously,	Ukrain-
ian	pressure	and	attempts	to	influence	Bratislava	(via	Brussels)	had	been	re-
ceived	by	the	Slovaks	with	irritation.	
Relations	with	Budapest	have	provoked	an	 internal	debate	 in	Ukraine	of	 far	
greater	 resonance	 than	 contacts	 with	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 or	 Slovakia.	 The	
central	issue	is	the	150,000	ethnic	Hungarians	living	in	the	Transcarpathian	
region,1	an	area	seen	by	the	elites	of	Kyiv	as	a	distant	and	incomprehensible	
place,	associated	mainly	with	a	clan-centred	political	system	based	on	income	
from	smuggling,	as	well	as	separatist	sentiments	attributed	not	only	to	the	lo-
cal	Hungarians	but	also	to	the	Transcarpathian	Ruthenians.
Hungary’s	policy	 is	 seen	 in	Ukraine	 through	 the	prism	of	 the	 relationship	
between	Budapest	and	Moscow,	and	the	situation	of	the	Hungarian	minor-
ity.	Kyiv’s	negative	reactions	regularly	induce	statements	from	Viktor	Orbán	
questioning	 the	 need	 to	maintain	 sanctions	 against	 Russia	 and	 calling	 for	
more	rights	for	the	Hungarian	minority	in	Transcarpathia.	During	the	last	
year,	the	biggest	reaction	in	Ukraine	came	to	the	demands	formulated	by	the	
Hungarian	government	to	extend	minority	rights	in	the	field	of	political	rep-
resentation,	cultural	autonomy	and	Kyiv’s	possible	consent	 to	dual	citizen-
ship	(see	Chapter	4).
In	its	official	statements,	the	government	in	Kyiv	does	not	treat	Budapest’s	de-
mands	to	extend	the	Hungarian	minority’s	rights	as	a	threat	to	Ukraine’s	ter-
ritorial	integrity.	Yet	nor	is	it	inclined	to	accept	these	demands,	and	it	has	been	
trying	to	dispel	Hungarian	concerns	regarding	its	minority	policies.	Kyiv’s	re-
luctance	to	extend	the	Transcarpathian	Hungarians’	rights	can	be	explained	
by	 fear	of	 setting	a	precedent	 that	 other	minorities	 could	 invoke,	 especially	
the	Russian	minority.	Relations	with	Russia	are	the	most	important	point	of	
reference	 for	 the	government	 in	Kyiv;	 to	a	great	extent	 these	determine	do-
mestic	policy	regarding	the	rights	of	the	national	minorities,	the	question	of	
1	 For	more	about	the	region	and	its	relations	with	Kyiv,	see	Piotr	Żochowski,	Tadeusz	Iwański,	
‘Zakarpattia	–	together,	but	separated’,	OSW Commentary,	30	September	2015;	https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-09-30/zakarpattia-together-separated
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criminalising	holders	of	dual	citizenship,	and	the	strengthening	of	the	role	of	
the	Ukrainian	language.	
Kyiv	has	not	set	any	obstacles	in	the	path	towards	consolidating	the	smallest	
administrative	units	(hromady)	with	predominant	Hungarian	populations.	This	
process	is	one	element	of	the	decentralisation	reform	and	the	de facto	creation	of	
local	government	in	Ukraine.	This	is	voluntary	in	nature,	and	provides	for	the	
consolidation	of	 small,	 economically	and	socially	 inefficient	units	 into	 larger	
ones,	the	so-called	nove hromady	or	associated	municipalities.	As	of	1	May	2017,	
only	5	of	the	planned	43	municipalities	of	that	kind	have	been	created	in	the	
Transcarpathian	region;	however,	 this	process	 is	not	being	pursued	 in	 those	
counties	in	which	Hungarians	predominate:	the	region	around	Berehove,	Uzh-
horod	and	Vynohradiv.	The	cause	seems	to	be	the	long-lasting	political	division	
within	the	Hungarian	national	minority	in	Ukraine,	as	well	as	the	personal	am-
bitions	of	the	individual	chairmen	of	the	hromady,	who	see	in	the	consolidation	
process	a	threat	to	their	own	positions	in	the	new	municipalities.
Hungary’s	negative	image	in	Ukraine	is	not	being	counterbalanced	by	reports	
about	Budapest’s	consistent	support	for	Kyiv	in	the	field	of	visa	liberalisation,	
territorial	integrity,	or	Hungarian	aid	for	the	victims	of	the	conflict	with	Rus-
sia	and	for	orphans	from	the	war	zone.	Reports	of	Hungarian	financial	support	
for	the	Transcarpathian	region,	which	has	not	been	formally	addressed	to	the	
Hungarians	alone	(€100	million	has	gone	to	stimulate	the	activity	of	small-	and	
medium	enterprises,	and	€50	million	to	extend	the	road	network)	have	also	
failed	to	find	a	hearing	in	Ukraine.	In	March	2017,	the	Ukrainian	parliament	
ratified	a	loan	agreement	with	Hungary,	including	investments	to	implement	
the	construction	of	a	bypass	at	Berehove	and	renovate	the	Mukacheve-Bere-
hove	road.
The	worsening	in	relations	with	Hungary	observed	in	recent	months	has	come	
against	the	background	of	the	activation	of	high-level	contacts.	Prime	Minis-
ters	Orbán	and	Hrojsman	met	in	September	and	November	2016,	first	during	
the	 forum	in	Krynica	and	then	 in	Budapest;	and	 in	April	2017	President	Po-
roshenko	talked	with	the	Hungarian	head	of	government	in	Malta.	Economic	
cooperation	has	also	recovered,	as	have	the	spheres	of	culture	and	education;	
for	example,	a	chair	of	Ukrainian	studies	was	opened	in	April	at	the	University	
of	Nyíregyháza.
Ukraine’s	 fairly	 instrumental	 treatment	 of	 its	 smaller	 partners	 in	 the	V4	 is	
linked	to	the	low	level	activity	of	Ukrainian	diplomacy	in	those	countries,	the	
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lack	of	effective	activities	in	the	field	of	public	diplomacy,	as	well	as	scandals	
involving	Ukrainian	diplomats.	In	June	2016,	Ukraine’s	ambassador	to	Slovakia	
Oleh	Havashi	was	sacked	when	the	Ukrainian	first	secretary	of	the	embassy	
in	Bratislava	 and	her	husband	were	 accused	 of	 smuggling	 cigarettes	 valued	
at	€22,000	across	the	Ukrainian-Hungarian	border.	(The	Ukrainian	embassy	
can	be	 traditionally	considered	a	sinecure	 for	 the	business	and	political	cir-
cles	of	 the	Transcarpathian	region).	 In	 turn,	 in	August	2016	President	Petro	
Poroshenko	dismissed	Ukraine’s	ambassador	to	the	Czech	Republic,	Boris	Zai-
chuk,	after	reports	that	the	Ukrainian	embassy	had	been	involved	in	helping	
one	Ali	Fayad,	a	Lebanese	arms	dealer	holding	Ukrainian	citizenship,	who	had	
been	 an	 adviser	 to	 President	 Yanukovych.	 Ambassador	 Zaichuk	 primarily	
owed	his	position	to	his	twin	brother	Valentyn,	who	headed	the	Chancellery	of	
the	Ukrainian	Parliament	from	2002	to	2015.	At	the	turn	of	2017	Kyiv	decided	
to	replace	the	staff	of	the	embassies	in	the	V4	countries;	the	new	ambassadors	
were	all	experienced	diplomats.	
For	years	smuggling	channels	have	run	across	the	Slovak-Ukrainian	and	Slo-
vak-Hungarian	borders,	through	which	cigarettes	and	other	contraband	has	
been	passed	on	a	massive	scale,	thanks	either	to	the	inaction	or	the	participa-
tion	of	the	representatives	of	the	Ukrainian	government.	This	is	the	work	of	
criminal	organisations	active	on	both	sides	of	the	border,	who	have	involved	
customs	officers,	local	authorities,	and	also	sometimes	diplomats	in	collabora-
tion	with	them.	Reports	in	the	Slovak	media	indicate	that	in	2016,	Slovak	cus-
toms	officers	seized	around	10	million	cigarettes	and	3.5	tons	of	tobacco	which	
was	being	 smuggled	 from	Ukraine.	Ukrainian	media	 regularly	 report	 about	
the	illegal	clearing	of	trees	on	the	Ukrainian	side	of	the	border	and	the	smug-
gling	of	the	timber	to	Slovakia	with	the	cooperation	of	Slovak	customs	officers.	
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	Slovak	and	Hungarian	governments,	protecting	
the	eastern	border	remains	an	important	challenge	for	regional	cooperation	
(including	within	the	Visegrad	group),	particularly	in	the	context	of	confront-
ing	possible	large-scale	movements	of	migrants.	
Jakub Groszkowski, Tadeusz iwański, andrzeJ sadecki
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